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ABSTRACT 
Background  Germany has been identified as one of a few high income countries 
that opposed a strong Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC), the World 
Health Organization’s first global public health treaty. We examined whether the 
tobacco industry had influenced the German position on the FCTC.  
Methods  Analysis of previously confidential tobacco industry documents  
Results  The tobacco industry identified Germany as a key target within its global 
strategy against the FCTC. Building on an already supportive base, the industry 
appears to have successfully lobbied the German government, influencing 
Germany’s position and argumentation on key aspects of the FCTC. It then used 
Germany in its efforts to weaken the FCTC. The evidence suggests that the industry 
enjoyed success in undermining the Federal Health Ministry’s position and using 
Germany to limit the European Union negotiating mandate. Tactics included the 
creation of controversy between the financial, trade and other ministries on one side 
and the health ministry on the other, the use of business associations and other front 
groups to lobby on the industry’s behalf and securing industry access to the FCTC 
negotiations via the International Standardization Organization.  
Conclusion  The evidence suggests that Germany played a major role in the 
tobacco industry’s efforts to undermine the FCTC. Germany’s position consistently 
served to protect industry interests and was used to influence and constrain other 
countries. Germany thus contributed significantly to attempts to weaken an 
international treaty and, in doing so, failed in its responsibility to advance global 
health.  
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What is already known? 
Germany has been identified as one of a few high income countries that attempted to 
counter a strong FCTC, yet the tobacco industry’s efforts to influence Germany’s 
position have yet to be examined in detail. 
 
What this study adds? 
Drawing on tobacco industry documents and other data, this paper shows that 
Germany played a crucial role in the tobacco industry’s efforts to undermine the 
FCTC. Germany’s stance was based on argumentation developed by the industry 
and in some instances appears to have been directly influenced by the industry. 
The German position consistently served to protect the interests of the tobacco 
industry and mobilised other negotiating parties in the industry’s fight against a strong 
FCTC. The study also provides further evidence of the very close links between the 
tobacco industry and the German government. 
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List of abbreviations 
 
BAT British American Tobacco 
DIN Deutsche Institut für Normung e.V. (German Institute for 
Standardization) 
EU European Union 
FCTC Framework Convention on Tobacco Control 
FHM Federal Health Ministry (Germany) 
GmbH Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung (limited company) 
INB International Negotiating Body 
ISO International Standardization Organization 
ISO/TC126 ISO Technical Committee 126 (tobacco products and testing 
methodologies) 
LTDL Legacy Tobacco Documents Library 
PM Philip Morris 
VdC Verband der Cigarettenindustrie 
WHA World Health Assembly 
WHO World Health Organization 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In May 2003 the United Nations’ WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control 
(FCTC), the World Health Organization’s (WHO) first global public health treaty, was 
unanimously adopted by the 56th World Health Assembly (WHA), eight years after 
the feasibility of an international tobacco control treaty had been examined. 
 
The convention that finally emerged from this protracted process has been widely 
hailed as successful in terms of content and its rapid and extensive ratification with 
172 states having become party to the convention by January 2011. Concern has 
nevertheless been expressed about inter alia the failure to clarify the FCTC’s 
relationship with trade agreements, its comparatively modest provisions when set 
against more optimistic initial ambitions, and the non-binding and unenforceable 
nature of many of its provisions.[1,2,3] While the strengths of the FCTC have been 
attributed to the leadership of developing countries, such weaknesses have been 
explained via intense pressure from a few high income countries, including Germany, 
that have enjoyed historically close links with tobacco companies.[3,4,5] 
 
Germany’s apparent approach to the FCTC is consistent with its weak tobacco 
control policies[6,7,8] and repeated opposition to European Union (EU) tobacco 
control legislation.[9] This stance has been recently explained via a complex interplay 
of factors[10] including Germany’s Nazi heritage, isolation from English speaking 
scientific and policy networks, reliance on industry self-regulation and long standing 
tobacco industry influence over science[11,12,13] and policy.[14,15,16] Despite its 
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largely adversarial stance during FCTC negotiations,[17] Germany signed the 
convention on 24 October 2003 and ratified it on 16 December 2004.  
 
Evidence from previously secret tobacco industry documents released through 
litigation in the United States indicates that transnational tobacco corporations 
developed both global[18,19,20] and targeted national strategies[5,21] to counter the 
FCTC. Recent literature has identified Germany as part of the “triumvirate of 
nations”[5] (Germany, Japan, United States) or the “big four”[22] (including China) 
that attempted to counter a strong convention. But to date, no detailed analysis of 
industry efforts to influence Germany’s position or the extent to which Germany’s 
position reflected such efforts has been undertaken. This paper therefore offers the 
first detailed account of tobacco industry attempts to influence the German 
government’s position and in turn, use this position to undermine the FCTC. It further 
explores the significant role Germany played during the FCTC negotiations.  
 
 8
METHODS 
 
This paper is based on analysis of previously confidential tobacco industry 
documents made available through litigation in the United States. Documents were 
identified through online searches of the Legacy Tobacco Documents Library (LTDL, 
http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/) between November 2006 and December 2008. In 
addition, the British American Tobacco Documents Archive 
(http://bat.library.ucsf.edu/) was searched until July 2008 when it was subsumed 
within the LTDL collection.  
 
Documents were identified through both English- and German-language search 
terms. Standard snowball technique was employed that initially used broad search 
terms such as FCTC, Framework Convention, WHO-Initiative, Tobacco Free 
Initiative, and their German equivalents along with Verband (as in “Verband der 
Cigarettenindustrie”) and names of German delegates at negotiations identified from 
official WHO lists of participants. The initial documents found were then used to 
identify further search terms. In total 198 search terms were used to retrieve over 
3000 documents. These were reviewed and, when identified as directly relevant to 
the subject of this study, archived, coded by theme, and subsequently analysed in 
detail to construct a historical and thematic narrative.[23] Although searches were not 
restricted to a specific time frame or tobacco company and relevant documents from 
Philip Morris (PM), RJ Reynolds and British American Tobacco (BAT) were identified, 
those from BAT dated between 1995 and 2003, proved the most relevant and 
represent the majority of documents finally used. In total 283 documents were coded 
and 74 used in this analysis.  
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The history of tobacco documents and the significance and limitations of their 
analysis have been detailed elsewhere.[24,25,26,27,28] To address such 
weaknesses, we attempted to triangulate and validate the document findings using 
information from other sources. We searched websites of industry organisations and 
non-governmental organisations mentioned in the documents. Although transcripts of 
the Treaty negotiations are not publicly available we searched official WHO 
documentation on the FCTC (e.g. lists of participants, agendas etc) and read all 
copies of the Alliance Bulletin, a bulletin published daily during treaty negotiations by 
the Framework Convention Alliance (an alliance of organizations committed to 
ensuring an effective FCTC), to identify information relating to Germany’s conduct 
during the negotiations. Triangulation, however, was not always successful, and 
while findings could be validated with respect to the overall account of events, for a 
number of details triangulation was not possible.   
 
Documents are quoted verbatim from the original regardless of the quality of the 
English. Where the authors have translated quotes from German-language 
documents, this is stated. 
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RESULTS 
 
Documents from BAT represented the most important source of information for this 
paper. BAT is headquartered in London, UK and has an important German 
subsidiary, BAT (Germany) GmbH. BAT is the world’s second largest quoted tobacco 
company (after PM International) and in Germany, with a market share of almost 
20%, the third largest company (after PM and Reemtsma, the latter now part of 
Imperial Tobacco). Key documents also originate in the Verband der 
Cigarettenindustrie (VdC), the tobacco manufacturer’s trade organization in 
Germany, reflecting the extensive correspondence between tobacco corporation 
headquarters in the USA and UK and their representatives in Germany. The VdC 
comprised all the main tobacco companies operating in Germany at the time (Box 1).  
 
Box 1: Membership of the “Verband der Cigarettenindustrie” (VdC) prior to its 
dissolution* 
Philip Morris GmbH 
British American Tobacco GmbH 
Reemtsma Cigarettenfabriken GmbH (now part of Imperial Tobacco) 
Gallaher Deutschland GmbH 
JT International Germany GmbH  
Tabak- und Cigarettenfabrik Heintz van Landewyck GmbH  
Joh. Wilh. von Eicken GmbH 
* The VdC was dissolved on 29 June 2007 following the departure of Philip Morris 
GmbH in May 2007 and re-established as Deutscher Zigarettenverband on 14 March 
2008 without Gallaher Deutschland GmbH (now part of JT International) and Philip 
Morris. 
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Industry intelligence gathering 
 
Exploring the German position 
In April 1998, Denise Keane, a member of the PM Board of Directors, and David 
Greenberg, PM’s Vice President of Corporate Affairs Strategy and Development, 
asked regional managers to contact selected national (including German) delegates 
before the 51st WHA in May 1998 (see Box 2 for timeline) to “assess national 
positions about the IFC [International Framework Convention]” and to examine how 
these were reached.[30] PM identified potentially sympathetic countries via positions 
taken during the 49th WHA (May 1996) debate[30,31] when Germany had apparently 
described the proposed convention as “an unnecessary distraction from the work of 
the WHO and not likely to be very effective”.[32] In 2001 BAT sent a questionnaire to 
company representatives in several European countries, including Germany, and 
enabled further analysis of national contexts in relation to the FCTC.[33] 
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Box 2: The FCTC and Germany’s position: A chronology  
1995 48th WHA requested to examine the feasibility of an international 
tobacco control treaty (resolution WHA48.11).  
1996 49th WHA called for the development of a framework convention on 
tobacco control (resolution WHA49.17). According to industry 
accounts, Germany voted against establishing a framework 
convention (along with Denmark, New Zealand, the Netherlands 
and the United Kingdom).[29]  
1998 Gro Harlem Brundtland took office as WHO Director General in 
July. 
1999 52nd WHA established the FCTC Working Group and the 
Intergovernmental Negotiating Body (INB) to negotiate the 
convention (resolution WHA52.18). 
1999-2000 The Working Group produced a draft convention at two meetings 
(25-29 October 1999 and 27-29 March 2000). 
2000 53rd WHA accepted the draft convention in May (resolution 
WHA53.16).  
2000 Public hearings on the proposed FCTC on 12-13 October in 
Geneva (over 500 written submissions including 12 from Germany 
and 144 verbal testimonies).  
2000-2003 Six negotiating sessions of the INB (INB1 to INB6) between 
October 2000 and February 2003.  
2003 56th WHA adopted the FCTC on 21 May.  
2003 Germany signed the FCTC on 24 October.  
2004 Germany ratified the FCTC on 16 December.*  
* While Germany continues to be involved in the ongoing FCTC process, it is beyond 
the scope of this paper to examine this process after ratification or the 
implementation of the FCTC provisions in Germany.  
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Tobacco corporations also employed deceptive strategies to explore the emerging 
German position towards the FCTC. In March 1999, Manfred Körner, former public 
relations lead at the VdC, interviewed Mr. Helmut Voigtländer, director of EU Affairs 
at the German Federal Health Ministry (FHM) and, significantly, member of both the 
WHO Executive Board[34,16] and the German delegation to the 49th (1996) and 50th 
WHA[32] (1997) and later of the second FCTC Working Group meeting.[35] Körner 
posed as a “journalist …investigating for an article on WHO tobacco policies” 
(translated[34]), concealing his affiliation with the VdC. Voigtländer reportedly 
provided information about FCTC related issues and expressed his opinion that the 
convention “should be kept very broad”, and that he did not believe in “radical anti-
tobacco measures” (translated[34]) such as advertising bans or price increases, and 
that he could envisage cooperating with the tobacco industry.[34] Körner’s report was 
then widely circulated among VdC members.[34]  
 
Following such investigations both PM and BAT rapidly identified Germany as a key 
country willing to raise concerns about and oppose a strong FCTC.[36,30,37] 
Regarded as a “big player”[38] with the capacity to act, Germany became a priority 
for industry lobbying efforts[38] and both PM and BAT subsequently contacted 
German delegates in seeking to assess and influence Germany’s position on the 
FCTC.[30,38] Germany’s potential significance to the industry was enhanced by its 
representation on the WHO Executive Board[39] and the Working Group[40] tasked 
with producing the draft convention during two meetings in October 1999 and March 
2000 (Box 2).  
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Germany, the ISO and WHO – gaining access to the negotiations 
The tobacco industry also gathered information via its well established links with the 
International Standardization Organization (ISO), notably Technical Committee 126 
(ISO/TC126) on tobacco products and testing methodologies.[41] ISO/TC126 
committee chairman Peter Adams was a former employee of Imperial 
Tobacco.[42,41] The committee’s secretariat was run by the German Institute for 
Standardization (DIN, Deutsche Institut für Normung e.V.) in Berlin, Germany[43]. 
DIN also had tobacco company employees serving on its own committee on tobacco 
smoke.[44] 
 
In early 1999 the WHO sought membership of ISO/TC126[45] and following 
discussion among both ISO/TC126 members[46,47,48] and tobacco companies,[45] 
in October 1999 WHO seems to have been accepted as a Category B member,[47] 
“in practice essentially as an observer… [unable to] vote, make any comments or 
statement.”[49,45] Meanwhile, as suggested by the VdC, ISO sought to exploit 
WHO’s application to join ISO/TC126 by requesting that, in exchange, an ISO 
representative be allowed to participate in WHO’s tobacco-related activities.[44,50] 
The effect of ISO’s attempt remains unclear, but when non-governmental 
organizations in official relations with WHO were invited to attend the first Working 
Group meeting, ISO was also invited.[51,50,46] The industry clearly saw this as an 
opportunity to obtain information on the FCTC,[42,52] with BAT commenting that 
"[w]e should know shortly exactly what the WHO is thinking."[52] Official WHO 
documentation confirms that ISO participated in the first and second Working Group 
meetings and at meetings of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Body (INB 1 to 4, see 
Box 2) being represented by Adams and other ISO and DIN staff.[53,35,54,55,56,57] 
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Industry links to the German government 
According to documents Reinhard Pauling, VdC board member and lead for FCTC-
related issues, had close contacts in the German Chancellery[58] and FHM,[59] 
including then FHM State Secretary Baldur Wagner.[59] Such contacts enabled the 
industry to acquire timely information about WHO activities and related EU 
actions,[60] relevant EU meetings[58] and the German government’s position on the 
FCTC.[61]  
 
A 2001 BAT Germany analysis of the latter suggests a close relationship between 
industry representatives and German government officials: “It is no problem at all to 
have meetings with the civil servants in charge and exchange views and 
documents.”[33] This document also indicates that the industry welcomed the 2001 
change in federal health minister from Andrea Fischer to Ulla Schmidt. The 
convention was “a top priority” for the former while the latter was not expected to “put 
much pressure on this initiative”.[33]  
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Lobbying to influence Germany‘s position 
 
In June 1999, Simon Millson, BAT manager responsible for FCTC issues, suggested 
targeting key countries like Germany rather than approaching multiple countries, in a 
“more sniper, less scatter gun” approach.[38] The VdC played a crucial role in such 
efforts within Germany, and BAT documents suggest that the VdC’s lobbying 
activities were effective,[62] for example, acknowledging the VdC’s success in 
communicating the company position to the German Government.[63] 
 
Creating and utilising intra-governmental conflicts 
Internationally, the industry sought to create and encourage controversy between 
government ministries. BAT repeatedly emphasised that “Health Ministers (and 
Governments) must be won over or brought under control by Finance and Trade 
Ministers”[64] and sought the latter’s participation in FCTC negotiations[65] to 
counter the health ministries’ influence. In Germany, the VdC encouraged several 
federal ministries (including finance and trade) to undermine the FHM support for an 
effective FCTC.[66,16] Pauling suggested in March 1999, that the VdC should inform 
the federal ministries of economy, finance and agriculture about the FCTC[34] in 
order to prevent Germany, represented through the FHM, from entering negotiations 
without the government agreeing a common position.[34] Such VdC activities appear 
to have happened with some success:[67] Pauling later reported that the 
Chancellery, prompted by tobacco industry lobbying, had asked relevant ministries to 
comment on the WHO initiative.[67] Pauling promised that the VdC would “do 
everything to increase opposition of the departments concerned and to bring about 
an inter-ministerial consultation” (translated[67]). Similarly, in August 1999 Ernst 
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Brückner, VdC director, wrote to the Federal Finance Ministry to highlight the alleged 
importance of tobacco tax revenue in Germany, raise legal concerns about WHO 
plans and suggest an inter-ministerial consultation before the first Working Group 
meeting.[68] 
 
Such efforts seemed to prompt the FHM to respond, informing other ministries both 
about the FCTC,[67,69] and of its plans to hold an inter-ministerial consultation after 
the first Working Group in October 1999.[70] The VdC seemingly had both access to 
inter-ministerial correspondence[69,71] and successfully intervened via other federal 
ministries, stymieing the FHM’s plan to postpone the inter-ministerial consultation to 
after the first Working Group.[72] As a result, the inter-ministerial consultation was 
held before the first Working Group,[72] and included, as Pauling informed the VdC 
member companies, a “very controversial debate between the different [federal] 
ministries” during which the FHM representatives were “quite surprised to learn” 
about the other ministries’ opposition to the FCTC.[73,72] Against the wishes of the 
FHM the ministries decided that Germany should only support initiatives on health 
information and education, labelling and cigarette content and not agree to other 
proposals including those on testing methods, smuggling, prices, duty free and 
advertising.[73] Pauling suggested that the German delegation would now assume 
the role of an observer.[72] An industry report on the Working Group meeting of 25-
29th October 1999 noted that Germany was one of very few countries to have non-
health representatives (including a representative of the Federal Ministry of 
Economy)[74,53] and that “[t]he German delegation… was silent.”[74]  
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Pauling later reported that while the FHM had refused to consult with the industry on 
the FCTC, other ministries pressed for such a meeting,[72] which documents suggest 
subsequently took place.[33,75]  
 
Securing allies  
Documents suggest that BAT successfully involved business associations, front 
groups and other organisations in its lobbying.[76,77] Five German business 
associations outside the tobacco sector made submissions to the WHO’s public 
hearings in October 2000,[78] advancing standard tobacco industry 
arguments[79,80] and making their submissions available to the VdC before the 
hearings.[79,80]  
 
A 2001 BAT analysis of Germany’s FCTC position suggests that cooperation 
between allies, described as the “the whole tobacco family” worked well.[33] A 
February 2001 newspaper confirms strong opposition to the FCTC by umbrella 
industry organisations like the Federation of German Wholesale and Foreign Trade 
(Bundesverband des deutschen Gross-und Aussenhandels), the German Association 
of Chambers of Industry and Commerce (Deutscher Industrie- und 
Handelskammertag), the Foreign Trade Association of the German Retail Trade 
(Außenhandelsvereinigung des deutschen Einzelhandels) and the Federation of 
German Industries (Bundesverband der deutschen Industrie e.V.).[81]  
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Influencing Germany’s argumentation and using Germany to 
advance industry arguments 
 
The documents suggest both that the industry helped frame the German 
government’s arguments against the FCTC and that Germany, in turn, played an 
important role in advancing industry arguments against the FCTC. 
 
Arguing for a flexible and broad based convention 
Using descriptors “broad”[82] and “flexible”[83] as euphemisms for a convention that 
did not contain binding obligations was a core industry strategy that aimed at 
securing a “broad convention.”[65,84,85,86] Japan’s role in arguing for a broad and 
flexible convention as a result of industry lobbying has been well documented.[5] 
Germany also appears to have been sympathetic to such an approach from the 
outset[83] and in November 1999, Millson wrote that the: 
“convention as being proposed by the WHO could contain some serious 
threats and concerns for the long term viability of the industry… We must 
therefore ensure that the convention and associated protocols are broad 
based. This view is shared by countries such as Germany, US, China, 
Japan…”[82] 
According to documents, Germany consistently supported a “flexible and broad 
convention”[63,77,87,88] and a ” more general, political document, without 
specifics.”[89] The industry reported that Germany argued, at the second Working 
Group meeting, that “as many member states as possible should be able to agree to 
the principles of the FC [framework convention]”, asserting that “flexibility in the text 
of the FC is a condition to success [sic].”[90,91]  
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Pushing for economic impact assessment of the treaty 
In 1999, Millson suggested using economic impact assessment, including 
assessment of the impact on jobs within tobacco agriculture, to delay approval of the 
FCTC and allow time to develop “other more substantial arguments”.[92] Millson 
suggested that this delay should be “proposed by a Latin American country (Brazil, 
Chile, Argentina) and seconded by a western country (say Germany, Japan)”.[92] 
The documents suggest that the German delegation played an important role in 
outlining economic arguments against the FCTC, adding economics and labour 
markets to the agenda for the first Working Group,[93] and stressing possible 
negative economic consequences of tobacco control[94] and the need for an 
economic impact study at the second Working Group meeting.[63,95] 
Simultaneously, BAT had been pushing for economic impact assessment of key 
policies in Europe as it saw this, along with risk assessment, as a means of 
preventing the implementation of tobacco control measures.[96,97]  
 
Arguing that “[a] total advertising ban would also be unconstitutional”[98] 
More specific arguments were developed against key elements of the proposed 
convention. BAT planned to audit protections for freedom of speech in national 
constitutions to demonstrate “the difficulty with introducing bans on advertising”[64] 
and such an audit was later cited by the International Advertising Association,[99] a 
tobacco industry “coalition partner”,[65] at the WHO’s public hearing. It claimed that 
in a study of 50 constitutions, freedom of expression was guaranteed in all.[100] Yet 
a copy of the study shows that “of all constitutions that were examined, only one – 
Sweden – protected commercial speech”.[99]  
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In 2000 the German Advertising Federation (Zentralverband der deutschen 
Werbewirtschaft of which the VdC was member) claimed, with regard to the FCTC, 
that a total advertising ban would be unconstitutional.[98] Germany was 
subsequently prominent in its opposition to comprehensive bans on tobacco 
advertising, promotion and sponsorship as being “unconstitutional”,[101,102] and the 
final FCTC text included exceptions for countries claiming such constitutional 
impediments. This followed earlier use of constitutional arguments to counter tobacco 
control measures in Germany[10,16] and the European tobacco advertising 
directive.[103]  
 
Lobbying Germany to limit the EU mandate 
In early 1999, the VdC commissioned Rainer Lagoni, professor of law at the 
University of Hamburg, to provide a legal opinion on the EU negotiating mandate[68] 
(see Box 3) in the hope they could use it to lobby against a comprehensive 
mandate.[68,60,104,105] His reports,[106,107,108,109] however, gave a generally 
favourable opinion on the EU’s ability to participate in the FCTC negotiations.  
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Box 3: The 1999 and 2001 EU negotiating mandates  
From 1994 until 2004 the EU comprised 15 member states. Additionally, 
there were 13 accession and candidate countries. EU Member States can 
authorise the European Commission to negotiate and sign international 
agreements on their behalf but the Commission can only represent 
Member States in policy areas covered by the EU Treaties. Under EU law, 
the EU is generally held to have exclusive competence in areas where it 
has already legislated (e.g. tar yields and tobacco product labeling); in 
other areas (e.g. tax or tobacco advertising) competence is shared 
between the EU and member states; and in further areas member states 
have exclusive competence. In an attempt to simplify this complex 
situation, two negotiating mandates were agreed between the EU and the 
member states in October 1999 and April 2001. These were not made 
public. The European Commission negotiated on behalf of the member 
states, accession and candidate countries in areas the EU had exclusive 
competence, while the country holding the Presidency negotiated in areas 
of shared and exclusive member states competence.[102] 
 
Germany’s position on the EU mandate was debated during the October 1999 
national inter-ministerial meeting.[73,110] Pauling reported that, in contrast to the 
FHM, the other ministries favoured a limited mandate restricted to labeling and 
cigarette contents,[73,72] seemingly surprising the FHM.[72] Documents indicate that 
Germany subsequently sought to circumscribe the EU mandate at a meeting of the 
permanent EU representatives on 15 October 1999[111] and, despite opposition from 
other EU member states,[111] managed to limit the EU mandate by excluding fiscal 
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and agricultural issues.[111] Pauling’s “contact in the Federal Chancellery”[58] 
confirmed Germany’s role in confining the mandate to areas in which the EU had 
already enacted legislation[112] and the VdC in turn claimed that Germany’s position 
was a direct result of industry lobbying with Pauling stating:  
“Lobbying: Via Berlin [seat of government] it is not only possible to encourage 
Germany to adopt a factual position, but also to influence the Council of Health 
Ministers – not without success, if you look at the limited EU mandate” 
(translated[60]).  
 
The debate about the EU negotiating mandate re-emerged in 2001 when a second 
EU mandate was agreed (Box 3). This followed concerns raised about the 
deficiencies of the first mandate and the annulment of an EU tobacco advertising ban 
in which Germany played a key role. VdC executive Axel Heim wrote to the German 
Chancellery, the permanent representative in Brussels and all relevant federal 
ministries, claiming that the European Commission was trying to expand its mandate 
beyond the agreed restrictive position.[113] He requested that the German ministries 
should once again agree a common position on the issue.[113] A 2001 BAT 
Germany document states: 
“Germany has been a key country in defining the scope of the EU mandate… 
Until now, our government refuses to grant more competences to the EU on 
grounds like taxation, subsidies and fraud. We are working hard with all of our 
allies to strengthen this position.”[33]  
Although the mandates were not made public (Box 3) and Germany’s role in securing 
or preventing any change is unknown, there is evidence that other EU member states 
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and the public health community were exasperated with Germany’s negative 
influence.[114,115]  
 
Using the German position to influence beyond the EU 
The tobacco industry perceived Germany as having a “constructive position” and a 
“stabilising effect” on other countries,[63] encouraging the creation of coalitions[86] 
and “the sharing of ideas between like-minded countries” that opposed the 
FCTC.[116] A memo from 20 October 1999 by Millson to Edgar Cordero, a BAT 
corporate affairs employee in Central America, shows that BAT attempted to use 
Germany’s position to influence Central American governments.[117] Millson sent 
Cordero information prepared by the VdC “regarding the position the German 
Government will adopt” at the first Working Group, and suggested that this might be  
“useful information to pass to the delegates [of some Central American 
governments] attending the meeting as it clearly states that the German 
Government has serious reservations about the FCTC”.[117]  
In a letter to the VdC member companies during the first Working Group meeting, 
Pauling reported “strong resistance” of Latin and Central American countries to the 
FCTC and noted that these countries “are insisting that demands concerning 
economic interests should lie outside the WHO’s competence”.[112] 
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DISCUSSION 
 
Our findings suggest that the tobacco industry successfully influenced the German 
government’s position, most notably by reducing the power of the FHM, and 
subsequently used the German government’s position in its global efforts to 
undermine the FCTC. 
 
The Chancellery appears to have had, in some instances, closer links to the industry 
than to the FHM, seemingly enabling the VdC to obtain detailed information on and 
shape the government’s position more effectively than the isolated FHM. The 
creation of intra-governmental conflicts based on alleged conflicts between health 
aims and economic goals was devised as a strategy to be used globally[118] but 
appears to have been particularly successful in Germany. While the industry took 
advantage of divisions between the FHM and economically orientated ministries, the 
documents suggest that it also manipulated the conflict to foster critics and to silence 
FCTC supporters within the German government.  
 
The VdC and DIN also provided the tobacco industry, through ISO, with access to 
formal FCTC negotiations. Evidence described in this paper shows that the tobacco 
industry gained direct access to the negotiations through ISO with Adams, a former 
employee of Imperial Tobacco, participating in Working Group and INB meetings. 
This is significant given WHO’s dual determination to exclude the tobacco industry 
from FCTC negotiations and enhance civil society participation in the process.[119] 
The industry’s determination to exploit its links with ISO demonstrates how easily 
legitimate civil society groups can also provide corporations with points of access to 
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decision making. This exploitation of civil society groups, along with the industry’s 
use of other business associations and front groups highlights the scale of the 
challenge outlined in article 5.3 of the FCTC calling upon parties to protect their 
public health policies from tobacco industry interference. 
 
Our study also highlights the persistent value to tobacco companies of arguments 
that might be regarded as having been effectively discredited. Notwithstanding the 
World Bank’s demonstration of neutral or even positive effects of tobacco control 
measures on the economy,[120,121] the documents report that the German 
delegation consistently voiced concerns about the FCTC’s alleged negative 
economic consequences. In part this may be attributable to the industry’s 
longstanding influence in Germany which has led to an exaggerated view of the 
significance of tobacco for Germany’s economy.[10] Similarly, constitutional 
arguments against tobacco control measures have long been employed by the 
industry in Germany,[10,16] and were reiterated to prevent binding provisions for 
advertising bans in the FCTC. While the tobacco industry commissioned legal reports 
to show that advertising bans would be unconstitutional in Germany[16] and 
advanced these arguments among German politicians and the public, the issue has 
been strongly contested amongst experts. Although the Federal Constitutional Court 
of Germany has not yet ruled on the constitutionality of banning tobacco advertising, 
it has given a strong indication that advertising bans may well be constitutional[122] 
and a recent legal analysis[122] concludes that a comprehensive tobacco advertising 
ban would be compatible with the German constitution. The industry’s ability to 
successfully use arguments in Germany that have been dismissed elsewhere may be 
due to its isolation from English speaking scientific policy networks,[10] which raises 
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issues about how this information might be better disseminated to non-English 
speaking countries. 
 
According to a typology[123] used in a review[124] of the negotiation of previous 
international framework conventions conducted for the tobacco industry, “veto states” 
or, given the difficulty of preventing conventions once negotiations are underway, 
“agenda weakening states” can be of immense strategic value.[124,123] The 
documents presented above demonstrate how Germany was targeted for and played 
such a role within FCTC negotiations. Its close links with the tobacco industry, 
established resistance to tobacco control measures, economic and political power 
within international relations and the EU, and prominent roles within the FCTC 
process all marked Germany as a state that could contribute to efforts to stop, 
weaken or undermine the negotiations. Indeed Germany itself finally agreed to, and 
subsequently signed and ratified the convention only when broad exceptions were 
included in Article 13 of the final FCTC text that allowed countries to implement bans 
on tobacco advertising, promotion, and sponsorship in accordance with their 
constitution or constitutional principles and decline bans for such reasons.  
 
Limitations 
It is important to note the study’s limitations. Although we attempted to triangulate 
and validate the evidence found, minutes of the treaty negotiations are not made 
publicly available online and could not therefore be analysed. The description of 
events is therefore mainly based on tobacco industry documents and thus largely 
represents the industry's perceptions of outcomes. In particular, a causal relationship 
between industry activities and the German government’s position and action is hard 
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to determine in part because it can be difficult to differentiate between the impact of 
tobacco industry activities described here and the effects of Germany’s longstanding 
opposition to stringent tobacco control. It is noteworthy, however, that Germany’s 
attitude to tobacco control generally also reflects decades of industry 
influence.[10,14,15,16] The industry clearly found an ally in Germany and the two 
often took a shared approach, for example in the desire for a “broad” convention. 
This resembles Japan’s role in negotiating optional language in the FCTC text.[5] 
The extremely close links between the German government and the tobacco industry 
are striking and most likely played a key part in shaping Germany’s position. Indeed 
this paper provides an illustration of the ease with which the industry operates in 
Germany.  
 
Conclusion 
The extent to which Germany’s participation in efforts to undermine the FCTC is 
directly attributable to industry influence is less significant than the fact that Germany 
consistently served to protect the industry’s interests and to influence and constrain 
other countries’ positions on the FCTC. The German government has thereby 
contributed significantly to attempts to weaken an international treaty aimed at 
reducing the 5 to 6 million global deaths that occur each year from tobacco use.[125] 
This is almost identical to Germany’s efforts to constrain and delay EU tobacco 
control policy.[9] The efforts of Germany and like-minded countries such as Japan,[5] 
China and the United States[22] constitute an abnegation of international 
responsibility, and a reminder of the ongoing challenges in ensuring that powerful 
vested interests do not undermine crucial initiatives in global health. 
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